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Abstract
Probabilistic event attribution aims to quantify the role of anthropogenic climate change in
altering the intensity or probability of extreme climate and weather events. It was originally
conceived to calculate the costs associated with any increased likelihood of the meteorological
event in question. However, only recently have such studies attempted to divide liability between
polluting nations and ascribe a cost. Recent protests indicate a perception that older generations
have the greater responsibility for climate change. In this paper, we examine how a portion of the
cost of an event can be attributed to any individual person, according to their age and nationality.
We demonstrate that this is quantitatively feasible using the example of the 2018 summer heatwave
in eastern China and its impact on aquaculture. A relatively simple technique finds sample
individuals responsible for between 0.53 and 18.10 yuan, increasing with their age and their
country’s emissions over their adult lifetime since the first international consensus on carbon
emissions was reached. This provides an illustration of the scale of such responsibilities, and how it
is affected by national development and demographics. Such data can support decisions, at
national and international levels, on how to fund recovery from climate impacts. It offers a simple
quantitative approach for individuals to know their impact on the climate, or for governments to
use in making policy decisions about how best to distribute costs of climate change.
1. Introduction
‘The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And,
if you choose to fail us, I say: “We will never for-
give you.”’ These words, spoken by Greta Thunberg
[1] at the United Nations Climate Summit in New
York, 23 September 2019, express the betrayal felt
by many in her generation. Emissions which have
given developed nations short- and medium-term
economic gains have caused long-term changes in
the global climate [2]. The cost of that change must
already be paid, and continue to be paid for the fore-
seeable future. This has long been predicted, with cal-
culations indicating that early action would be less
costly in the long term [3]. The phrasing ‘choose to
fail’ used by Thunberg is arguably apt, since those
who have profited from emissions while knowing the
risks to the climate have, in essence, chosen to take a
loan that they and younger generations are now start-
ing to pay back, and will continue to have to pay for
many years to come. Given the current strength of
feeling, would it be surprising if the younger genera-
tions, once in a position of power, insist that the older
should pay the debt themselves?
Allen [4] first explained how to calculate human
liability for extreme weather events, and the field
of event attribution has grown out of that concept.
While an interesting research topic in its own right,
it has not joined up with efforts of the international
community to address loss and damage [5], where it
is often viewed as controversial and distracting from
the immediate need for disaster response [6]. Nev-
ertheless, the means to quantify the anthropogenic
component of the cost of weather events through
attribution studies, then subdivide it amongst nations
or corporations according to the ‘polluter pays’
© 2021 Crown copyright & The Authors. Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 104040 F C Lott et al
principle [7], is already possible in theory [8–11].
Were an international framework established to pro-
duce and use such results, nations could potentially
receive invoices. Younger generations may wish to see
older individuals pay proportionally more of these
bills, in line with their responsibility for historic
emissions.
If such a choice is made, it is important to be
as fair, objective and transparent as possible. Thus,
in this paper we examine the data and calculations
required for dividing up responsibility for (and asso-
ciated cost of) an example event amongst individuals
according to their personal emissions.
2. Method
2.1. Quantifying relative culpability
How can we divide up the cost of the impact of an
extreme event? Event attribution studies have been
doing the first stage of this for many years now. Since
the question being asked is more usually, ‘How much
more likely was this event after climate change?’, the
risk ratio (RR =
Pall
Pnat
) has become the common meas-
ure of event attribution (where Pall is the probabil-
ity of the event in worlds with all external climate
forcings, both natural and anthropogenic, and Pnat is
the probability with only natural forcings). However,
the original metric used by Allen [4], the fraction of
attributable risk (FAR = 1− PnatPall ) is more applicable
here, since it answers the question, ‘What fraction of
the probability of this event is anthropogenic?’ Allen
suggests using this as the fraction of the cost of the
impact which should be charged to those responsible
for the change in the climate, an idea recently revisited
by Frame et al [10]. This is therefore our starting point
for this study, while acknowledging that a full impact
calculation needs to quantify exposure, vulnerability
and response in addition to hazard [12].
Otto et al [8] divide that responsibility amongst
nations according to their cumulative emissions.
Their technique is contingent on the extremity of
the climatic variable in the event in question being
proportional to cumulative emissions (this precludes
examining climatic tipping-points). This is true also
in the observational attribution technique of van
Oldenborgh [13], which uses either global mean sur-
face temperature or atmospheric CO2 concentration
as a covariate in the distribution of the variable of
interest. We adapt this technique to the problem
examined by Otto et al, allowing the distribution to
vary with cumulative anthropogenic carbon emis-
sions, rather than physically modelling the changes
to the atmosphere in the absence of a proportion of
those emissions. It also enables us to extend the prin-
ciple to much smaller scales, so that, by calculating an
individual’s emissions, we can consider their personal
FAR. We then follow Frame et al [10] to simply estim-
ate their financial liability by multiplying FAR by the
cost of the event.
Otto et al also show the importance of the order
in which emissions by individual countries are added
to the global total, and how sensitive their calculated
responsibility is to this result. This is because a lin-
ear change in the extremity of an event results in a
non-linear change in its probability. This effect is also
present in our study, but is reduced by our framing.
We examine climate change due to emissions starting
from the New Year following the publication of the
First Assessment Report of the IPCC [14], i.e. January
1991, so only consider emissions from 1991 onwards.
By this point, governments had agreed consensus to
the conclusion of the First Assessment Report, that
human emissions will enhance the greenhouse effect,
resulting on average in additionalwarming.Using this
baseline is in accord with a range of policy studies,
as discussed by Mittiga [7]. Because this period has
a higher initial greenhouse gas concentration, it also
reduces the Otto et al problem of the sensitivity of
the national or individual FAR to when emissions take
place.
It is also worth noting that the approach of Otto
et al implies the ‘polluter pays’ principle [7] for divid-
ing up liability for events. Ourmove to the scale of the
individual will move this framing closer to the ‘bene-
ficiary pays’ principle or Mittiga’s related ‘consumer
pays’ principle [7]. Where this is deemed inappropri-
ate from a policy perspective, further development of
the methodology will be required.
2.2. Determining individual contribution
For an extreme recorded temperature of Tobs, we can
obtain the probability of all events as hot or hotter as
follows:








where cdf() is the cumulative distribution for the
event. µ (the mean or location parameter, depend-
ing on the distribution) is chosen to vary with total
global anthropogenic carbon emissions εglobal, while
the shape (ξ) and scale (σ) parameters are assumed
constant as described by van Oldenborgh [13]. Note
that the start date for counting emissions is arbitrary,
so long as it is consistent through all calculations.
1961 is used in this study, since this is the beginning
of our observed temperature time series. The choice
of distribution and covarying parametermust depend
on the variable in question. For example, rainfall
tends to be gamma distributed, so uses the scale para-
meter as covariate with εglobal. It is also prudent to
incorporate a response time between the emissions
and its effect on the climate. vanOldenborgh achieves
this with a 3 year rolling average on their covariate.
We adopt this, mapping the distribution in year Y to
εglobal (Y− 1), so that emissions later than the event
do not affect the calculation. Sample uncertainty on
this probability can be evaluated by bootstrap res-
ampling the temperature data to fit a range of para-
meters to the data.
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Once derived, these probabilities feed into FAR,
after which a simple multiplication by the cost of
the event (cevent) in question yields the anthropogenic
cost (canthro).
canthro = ceventFAR.
Otto et al [8] attribute changes to a given nation
by either modelling the change in FAR in the absence
of that country’s emissions, or alternatively in the
absence of all other countries’ emissions. This gives a
low and high estimate respectively. Here, rather than
using a physical model, we model the statistical shift
in the cdf with the same presence or absence of emis-
sions, either relative to those up to the first year of
responsibility (here ε1990) or relative to global emis-
sions since then (εglobal). This technique may equally
be applied on the smaller scale of individuals, rather
than whole nations. Because this results in a much
smaller change in the climate, as well as being set
against the higher baseline of 1990, the difference
between the high and low estimates is less dramatic
than those discussed by Otto et al.
Low estimate :


















F indivAR = 1−
1− cdf(Tobs,µ(ε1990) ,σ,ξ)
1− cdf(Tobs,µ(ε1990 + εindiv) ,σ,ξ)
To calculate the individual’s emissions (εindiv), we
use the annual carbon emissions of the nation whose
citizenship the individual holds [15] and annual adult
population total [16]. Taking the simplest assumption
of equal responsibility amongst a country’s adult pop-
ulation, we can divide emissions by the adult popu-








Y0 is the first year of responsibility of the individual;
Yevent is the year in which the extreme event in ques-
tion happened; εY is the national carbon emissions
total for year Y; pY is the adult population of that
nation in year Y.
3. Case study results—East China 2018
heatwave
As a case study, we examine a heatwave previously
presented by Ren et al [17]. This example is chosen
to demonstrate an approach that could be takenmore
widely. We make no judgement as to the importance
of this particular event (or its impacts) relative to
other weather events. Ren et al report losses of
6.87 billion yuan renminbi by Chinese aquaculture
alone. We also use this figure, without examining
whether this loss/damage could have been avoided.
This will be a crucial component in future work,
but for now this cost is merely illustrative. Since
other losses are not stated, our results are likely to be
conservative. Based on their maximum of a 30 d run-
ning average of daily minimum temperature anom-
aly (referred to as TNx30) relative to 1961–2013,
we adapt the covariate-based attribution technique
of van Oldenborgh [13], fitting a Gumbel distribu-
tion (as we do not expect a physical upper or lower
limit for such extremes) to TNx30 observations from
1961 to 2018, detrended relative from global cumu-
lative anthropogenic carbon emissions. Figure 1 sug-
gests that TNx30 has a linear relationship with carbon
emissions, confirming the validity of the technique
for this event. Once fit, the scale parameter is fixed
and the location parameter scales with emissions, as
shown in figure 2. This gives this heatwave a central
FAR estimate of 0.88 for global anthropogenic carbon
emissions since 1991, thus an attributable anthropo-
genic cost of 6.1 billion yuan.
From here, we calculate the cost to individuals in
four illustrative countries, using their age to estim-
ate emissions by assuming equal emissions across the
national adult population. Emissions are shown in
table 1, with the corresponding cost ranges in table 2
allowing those emissions to have taken place at any
time between 1991 and 2017. Note that in all cases
here, we assume an adult ‘age of responsibility’ of
18 years, and only count complete emission years
where the individual is older than that.
By examining the 5th to 95th bootstrap percent-
iles of theGumbel fit to carbon emissions, we find that
the sample uncertainty from using this observation-
based technique with only 57 sample years is much
larger than that produced by emission date in table 2.
The FAR range from global emissions determined by
this technique is 0.81–0.94, corresponding to a total
anthropogenic cost for this event of 5.6–6.4 billion
yuan. The corresponding individual cost ranges are
shown in table 3. For future studies, this uncertainty
rangemay likely be reduced by using a large ensemble
of simulations in place of observations. Uncertainties
in the original financial cost of the event must also be
carried through. As Frame et al point out [10], these
are likely to be larger than uncertainties related to cli-
mate change.
4. Discussion
At this point, the reader may be asking the place
of these calculations in the broader climate science
endeavour. There are a number of ways in which such
information could be used and we speculate on some
of them here, without judging their desirability. One
3
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 104040 F C Lott et al
Figure 1. Relationship between the maximum of the 30 day running-mean daily minimum temperature anomaly relative to
1961–2013 (TNx30) and the global cumulative anthropogenic carbon emissions since 1961, in gigatonnes.
Figure 2. TNx30 observations, raw (black vertical bars) and detrended with respect to carbon emissions since 1961 (grey bars).
A Gumbel distribution is fitted to the detrended data, then its location parameter scaled to 1991 (green) and 2018 (red) levels of
atmospheric carbon.
Table 1. Personal mass of carbon, to the nearest tonne, emitted from year of responsibility (the later of 1991 or the first full year aged




25 30 35 40 46+
Sweden 10 19 30 41 55
China 14 24 30 36 41
Russian Federation 24 43 61 80 110
United States of America 37 71 109 147 192
possibility is to use this to enable people to assess
their own impact on the climate. When an extreme
event happens, for example, they might wish to con-
tribute to charities working to improve resilience to
future events. These figures could help them to decide
their contribution. Another possibility is for an over-
seeing effort which sums the contributions over all
events experienced in a year, expressed as the cost
of a nation or individual’s activities, incorporating
reimbursement for any impacts felt by that country.
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Table 2. Upper and lower bounds (based on order of emissions as per Otto et al 2017) for personal responsibility, in yuan renminbi, for




25 30 35 40 46+
Sweden 0.69–0.71 1.38–1.43 2.17–2.25 3.00–3.13 4.02–4.20
China 1.05–1.07 1.75–1.81 2.22–2.30 2.59–2.70 2.99–3.13
Russian Federation 1.72–1.76 3.11–3.22 4.47–4.65 5.83–6.08 8.04–8.41
United States of America 2.66–2.72 5.18–5.36 7.93–8.24 10.71–11.17 13.95–14.59
Table 3. As table 2 but with uncertainties incorporating both emission date and the 5%–95% bootstrap range in fitting the Gumbel
distribution to the detrended TNx30 observations.
```````````Nationality
Age in 2018
25 30 35 40 46+
Sweden 0.53–0.87 1.05–1.78 1.65–2.84 2.28–3.91 3.09–5.16
China 0.79–1.33 1.34–2.24 1.72–2.92 1.94–3.36 2.27–3.80
Russian Federation 1.31–2.16 2.37–3.93 3.38–5.77 4.44–7.52 6.09–10.44
United States of America 2.01–3.40 3.91–6.68 6.06–10.14 8.21–13.91 10.89–18.10
We will also see events which are less likely after
climate change, such as most cold waves, and thus
reduced costs of events could be incorporated into
the total. Note that the traditional definition of FAR
has little meaning in this case, and an alternative
such as that discussed by Hansen et al [18] would
need to be adapted to quantify any benefit of climate
change.
Since a substantial operational attribution effort
would be required to attain the FAR for every event,
one future option could be to incorporate this
into a seasonal forecasting system. This would then
also open the possibility of attributing a change in
probability of an event which did not occur, but had a
higher probability in the natural world, and incorpor-
ating this reduction in cost. As Frame et al [10] note,
arriving at potential costs for unseen events is work
in itself. Their discussion of economic modelling of
indirect losses may indicate the direction such devel-
opmentsmight take.We can also include the costs and
benefits of mean climate change, though we might
expect costs to outweigh benefits, given much infra-
structure is adapted to the past climate. We must also
be aware of the limits of adaptation and, in turn, the
limits of our knowledge, to ensure fair treatment of
countries with weather which is difficult to predict
and attribute.
The calculation in this paper is an illustrative
example to demonstrate feasibility. We chose the
simplest method we could for such an illustration,
and as such is not a policy recommendation. All indi-
viduals in a country are assumed to emit equally
in any given year, so the total national emission in
that year is divided equally. Summing over each year
of their adulthood after 1990 would give their total
responsible emission. Monetary contribution follows
straightforwardly, but with some interesting political
decisions to be made if this method were used for
taxation. If adult emissions are chosen in preference
to lifetime emissions, are parents then to pay addi-
tionally based on having children? Are post-1990
emissions by persons now deceased absorbed by the
state, ormust the inheritors of their estate be charged?
(This is an extension of the ‘disappearing perpetrat-
ors problem’ [19].) Many value judgements would
need to be made if such approaches were implemen-
ted in practice, which are far outside the remit of this
paper.
Using data from the tax system may make weaker
assumptions possible, depending on the detail of his-
torical records kept on individuals. For example, we
might seek to use the link between income and energy
consumption [20] by subdividing the annual con-
tribution amongst the population by their personal
income in that year. This may come closer to charging
an individual for their true emissions, but because
it uses historical income, it might be considered a
wealth tax.
Both these assumptions arguably fail to reward
the environmentally conscious individual (or
penalise the negligent). One’s past actions are diffi-
cult to prove, butmay not be impossible. For example,
credit rating agencies might retain enough sales data
to offer a personal score. Performing such calcula-
tions is beyond the scope of this paper, and future
work in economics and political science can refine
these options. Indeed, many would argue that cor-
porations, rather than individuals, should pay for the
impacts of climate change. One technique to calculate
this has already been demonstrated by Ekwurzel et al
[11], and the method used in our paper could also
be extended to such a policy. Since we have demon-
strated that calculating an individual contribution
to the changing probability of extreme events is now
mathematically feasible, it is even more relevant for
those with policy expertise to examine all these issues.
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5. Conclusions and future work
In this study, we have attributed a fraction of the
probability of an extreme event to the carbon emis-
sions of an individual. For simplicity, only the effect
of carbon emissions is included, but aerosol emis-
sions and land use change can also have significant
impacts on a localised scale. These will be particu-
larly important for rapidly developing nations, so this
should be incorporated in future studies of this type
where possible.
We used these results to examine the cost of that
event incurred by the individual, including uncer-
tainty ranges. Assessing this can be useful for the indi-
vidual to understand their own impact, and for soci-
ety to understand the impact of different demograph-
ics. For a broader range of policy options on a national
and international level, these calculations must be
adapted in future work. We have discussed building
these techniques into an operational attribution sys-
tem that would sum over all events in a period and
give an individual’s total balance. The reduction of
uncertainty ranges will be key in that future system,
but they can never be fully eliminated. Their handling
(e.g. whether the cost to an individual is calculated
from the minimum or best estimate) may ultimately
be a political decision.
Assigning blame for climate change is necessarily
an emotive subject, and will likely become more so as
its impacts are felt increasingly widely. As Boyd notes
[6], fear of paying compensation has shaped inter-
national discussions of loss and damage. Such fear is
often greater when it is of an unknown potential. We
hope that our example calculation on a personal scale
can reduce this fear. We believe that this study offers a
useful tool to help address the problem in an object-
ive, quantitative and diplomatic manner.
Data availability statement
The data that support the findings of this study are
available upon reasonable request from the authors.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Stephen Belcher, Jason Lowe, Stephen P
Haddad and Stuart Fox for advice and encourage-
ment in the drafting of this manuscript. Thanks
also to Rachel James, who conceived that this work
might be used to suggest charitable donations, and
to our editor and reviewers. This work was sup-
ported by the EUPHEME project, which is part
of the ERA4CS, an ERA-NET initiated by JPI Cli-
mate and co-funded by the European Union (Grant
690462). It was also supported by the Met Office
Hadley Centre Climate Programme, funded by BEIS
and Defra. A D K was supported by the Australian
Research Council (DE180100638) and acknowledges
support from the Australian Research Council Centre
of Excellence for Climate Extremes. SFBT was sup-
ported by the U.K.–China Research and Innovation
Partnership Fund through theMetOfficeClimate Sci-
ence for Service Partnership (CSSP) China as part of
the Newton Fund. D W was funded by the National
R&D Program of China (2018YFC1507702).
ORCID iDs
Fraser C Lott https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5184-
4156
Andrew D King https://orcid.org/0000-0001-
9006-5745
Simon F B Tett https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7526-
560X
References
[1] Thunberg G 2019 No-one Is Too Small to Make a Difference
(London: Allen Lane)
[2] IPCC 2013 Climate change 2013: the physical science basis
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ed T F Stocker, D Qin, G-K Plattner, M Tignor, S K Allen,
J Boschung, A Nauels, Y Xia, V Bex and P MMidgley
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p 1535
[3] Stern N 2007 The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern
Review (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
[4] Allen M 2003 Liability for climate change Nature 421 891–2
[5] UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.19 2013Warsaw International
Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate
Change Impacts (Bonn: UNFCCC)
[6] Boyd E et al 2017 A typology of loss and damage perspectives
Nat. Clim. Change 7 723–9
[7] Mittiga R 2019 Allocating the burdens of climate action:
consumption-based carbon accounting and the
polluter-pays principle Transformative Climates and
Accountable Governance. Palgrave Studies in Environmental
Transformation, Transition and Accountability
ed B Edmondson and S Levy (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan)
(https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97400-2_8)
[8] Otto F E L et al 2017 Assigning historic responsibility for
extreme weather events Nat. Clim. Change 7 757–9
[9] Lewis S C, Perkins-Kirkpatrick S E, Althor G, King A D and
Kemp L 2019 Assessing contributions of major emitters’
Paris-era decisions to future temperature extremes Geophys.
Res. Lett. 46 3936–43
[10] Frame D J et al 2020 Climate change attribution and the
economic costs of extreme weather events: a study on
damages from extreme rainfall and drought Clim. Change
162 781–97
[11] Ekwurzel B, Boneham J, Dalton MW, Heede R, Mera R J,
Allen M R and Frumhoff P C 2017 The rise in global
atmospheric CO2, surface temperature, and sea level from
emissions traced to major carbon producers Climatic Change
144 579–90
[12] Simpson N P et al 2021 A framework for complex climate
change risk assessment One Earth 4 489–501
[13] van Oldenborgh G J 2007 How unusual was autumn 2006 in
Europe? Clim. Past 3 659–68
[14] Houghton J T (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
and World Meteorological Organization) 1990 IPCC first
assessment report (Geneva: WMO)
[15] Global Carbon Project 2018 Supplemental data of global
carbon budget 2018 (Version 1.0) [Data set] Global Carbon
Project (https://doi.org/10.18160/gcp-2018)
[16] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division 2019World Population Prospects 2019
6
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 104040 F C Lott et al
Online edn (available at: https://population.un.org/wpp/
Download/Standard/Population/)
[17] Ren L et al 2020 Anthropogenic influences on the persistent
night-time heat wave in summer 2018 over Northeast China
Bull. Am. Meteorol. Soc. 101 S83–S88
[18] Hansen G et al 2014 On the attribution of a single event to
climate change J. Clim. 27 8297–301
[19] Page E A 2011 Climatic justice and the fair distribution of
atmospheric burdens: a conjunctive accountMonist
94 412–32
[20] Oswald Y, Owen A and Steinberger J K 2020 Large inequality
in international and intranational energy footprints between
income groups and across consumption categories Nat.
Energy 5 231–9
7
